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TOWARD A PRAGMATIC CONCEPTION 
OF RELIGIOUS FAITH! 
Joshua L. Golding 
One issue in the debate about faith concerns the stance a religious person is 
committed to take on "God exists." I argue that this stance is best understood 
as an assumption that God exists for the purpose of pursuing a good relation-
ship with God. The notion of an "assumption for practical purpose" is dis-
tinguished from notions such as "belief" and "hope." This stance is contrasted 
with others found in discussions of faith, and its ramifications for the problem 
of whether it is rational to have faith are discussed. 
Introduction 
One major issue at stake in the debate about the nature of religious faith is 
the stance a religious person is committed to taking on the proposition "God 
exists," given the fact that he is religious. Although there are other legitimate 
starting points for debating the nature of religious faith, a focus on this 
particular issue is constructive for the following reasons. Firstly, the stance 
which a religious person is supposed to take on the proposition "God exists" 
will presumably have serious practical consequences for the way that person 
lives. In order to understand the nature of these consequences, one must 
understand that stance itself, and the manner in which that stance is rooted 
in the religious life. Secondly, it is this stance which philosophers often seem 
to be concerned with when they raise the question of whether it is (or can 
be) rational to have faith. Philosophers are particularly concerned with what 
is required of the religious person with respect to the proposition "God ex-
ists," since, from certain perspectives at least, this is a rather problematic 
proposition. Moreover, the question of whether it is (or can be) rational to 
have faith is of special interest precisely because we want to know whether 
it is (or can be) rational to be religious. After all, if faith were not in some 
way a necessary part of the religious life, we would not be so interested in 
determining whether it is (or can be) rational. For these reasons, then, it is 
constructive to focus the debate about religious faith on the question, What 
stance is a religious person committed to take on the proposition "God exists"? 
The present paper aims to provide an answer to this question. It does not 
aim to provide aJull answer to the question, What is religious faith? For faith 
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may involve more than some stance on the proposition "God exists." How-
ever, to the extent that faith does involve some such stance, this paper aims 
to provide a partial answer to the question, What is religious faith? 
Now it is obvious that the nature of this stance can be settled only in the 
context of some conception of what it is to be a religious person. Accordingly, 
this paper begins with an attempt to work out such a conception. The bulk 
of this paper then expounds and defends the view that a religious person is 
committed to making a certain sort of "assumption for practical purpose" that 
God exists. The notion of an "assumption for practical purpose" is often used 
in ordinary speech, and occurs in philosophical discussions as well, particu-
larly in contexts where a claim is made to the effect that some such "assump-
tion for practical purpose" is rationally justified.2 Doubtless there are several 
senses this notion can take, yet it is rarely explicated with precision. Hence, 
it will be necessary to work out the notion of an "assumption for practical 
purpose" in some detail, and to contrast it with other neighborhood notions 
such as "belief' and "hope." I shall then formulate a general condition under 
which it is pragmatically rational for a person to make such an assumption, 
which will facilitate the argument that a religious person is committed to 
taking precisely this sort of stance on the proposition "God exists." For the 
sake of clarification, I shall then contrast this view with other accounts of 
religious faith expounded in recent literature. Finally, I shall briefly discuss 
the implications of this view for the problem of whether it is (or can be) 
rational to have religious faith. 
1. The Religious Person 
Quite obviously, it is possible to propose different and perhaps even mu-
tually incompatible conceptions of what it is to be a religious person. Nev-
ertheless, it is legitimate to demand that any such proposal meet the following 
criteria. Firstly, it must characterize a great bulk of people who are designated 
as "religious" in ordinary speech, and it must fail to characterize a great bulk 
of people who are not so designated. Secondly, the proposal should be fruitful 
in giving us some handle on normative questions as to whether it is good or 
bad, rational or irrational to be religious. 
I propose the following. A person is religious if and only if he pursues the 
goal of having a good relationship with God. The remainder of this section 
is devoted to elaboration and defense of this proposal. 
First, some elaboration. There are three elements here: the notion of pur-
suing a goal, the notion of God, and the notion of a good relationship with 
God. To begin with, let us remark briefly on the latter two. First, the term 
"God" here denotes some possible being (a being that mayor may not exist) 
who is in some sense radically supreme. Precisely what this supremacy 
amounts to is left open here. Some may conceive of this being as having 
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intelligence and will, while others may conceive of this being as an imper-
sonal force or spirit. Similarly, the notion of a good relationship with God is 
left open. Different religious persons will have different conceptions of what 
makes for a supreme being as well as of what makes for a good relationship 
with God. Finally, we may note that the notion of God as a supreme being 
does not prima facie pose any philosophical difficulty, nor does the notion 
of a good relationship with God. Now depending on how these notions are 
developed in detail, problems may arise concerning their logical coherency. 
However, it is not our business here to consider such developed notions, nor 
such problems as they may pose. 
What requires more elaboration here is the notion of pursuing a goal, in 
this case the goal of having a good relationship with God. The following 
rough analysis will apply, mutatis mutandis, to the pursuit of any goal; for 
the sake of brevity let's confine our discussion to the religious case. Firstly, 
a person may pursue the goal of having a good relationship with God only if 
he has some conception of what that goal is like. This means, of course, that 
he must have some conception of God and of what makes for a good rela-
tionship with God. Secondly, a person may pursue that goal only if he desires 
to have a good relationship with God. This desire may be "impure" or "pure," 
that is, it mayor may not be a desire that is in turn motivated by a desire for 
something ulterior, such as, the desire to maintain family tradition. Or, it may 
be a mixture of both. In any case, this desire alone is not sufficient for 
pursuing a good relationship with God; another condition is that one acts on 
that desire by doing (or refraining from) those actions which one believes are 
more (rather than less) likely to result in one's having that relationship. Now 
the extent to which one does (or refrains from) those actions may vary from 
"always" to "sometimes" to "once in a while"; this will determine the extent 
to which one pursues a good relationship with God. Finally, implicit in 
"acting on the desire" for a good relationship with God is yet another condi-
tion, namely, that in the first place one believes that some actions are more 
(rather than less) likely to result in one's having that relationship. If one 
believes that no matter what one does (or refrains from), one is just as likely 
to succeed in having that relationship, one cannot properly be said to "act on 
a desire" to have that relationship. Precisely what it means to "act on a desire" 
is a tricky question, but for our purposes we need not carry the analysis 
further. In sum, we may say that a person pursues the goal of having a good 
relationship with God if and only if: 
a) he has some conception of God and of what makes for a good relationship 
with God, 
b) he desires to have that relationship, 
c) he believes that some actions are more (rather than less) likely to result 
in his having that relationship, and. 
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d) he acts on his desire to have that relationship by (to some extent) doing 
(or refraining from) those actions. 
Now there is an important distinction to be made between two classes of 
people who may be said to pursue this goal. Firstly, there are those who 
believe they already have a good relationship with God and are trying to 
maintain or perhaps improve that relationship. Secondly, there are those who 
do not believe they have that relationship, but who are trying to attain it in 
the first place. Of course, the boundary of this distinction is not so sharp: a 
person may not be sure whether his relationship with God is good. Moreover, 
the same person may drift from one of these classes to the other. 
So much for elaboration of the proposal that a person is religious if and 
only if he pursues the goal of having a good relationship with God. I submit 
that this proposal meets the above criteria for an adequate conception of what 
it is to be a religious person. Firstly, it characterizes a great bulk of people 
who are designated "religious" in ordinary speech, and does not characterize 
a great bulk of people who are not so designated. Of course, it would be 
preposterous to claim that it fits every occasion on which the phrase "reli-
gious person" is used. Most notably, although many would describe polythe-
ists and Zen Buddhists as "religious," neither group can be said to "pursue 
the goal of having a good relationship with God." But the proposal covers 
not only "monotheists" such as Jews, Christians, and Muslims, but indeed 
anyone who pursues a good relationship with a being whom he or she con-
siders radically supreme. Secondly, this proposal is fruitful in giving us a 
handle on normative questions about the religious life. We can now ask, for 
example, whether the conception in (a), the desire in (b), the belief in (c), 
and the policy in (d) are, respectively, coherent or incoherent, good or bad, 
true or false, rational or irrational. In what follows, we shall adopt this 
proposal in order to work out what stance a religious person is committed to 
take on the proposition "God exists." 
2. Must the Religious Person Believe That God Exists? 
It is clear that whether or not God exists, there certainly are religious 
persons. It is equally clear that no religious person can succeed in his goal 
of having a good relationship with God if God does not exist. Whether a 
religious person is committed to believe that God exists is a matter to which 
we now turn our attention. Recall that there are two classes of religious 
persons. Firstly, there are those who believe they have a good relationship 
with God and are trying to maintain or perhaps improve that relationship. 
Secondly, there are those who do not believe they have that relationship, but 
are trying to attain it in the first place. Now it is patent that the first class of 
persons are committed to believing that God exists, for it would be irrational 
or incoherent to believe that one has a good relationship with God without 
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believing that God exists. In general, if one believes that one has a relation-
ship with X, one is committed to believing that X exists. It may be said that 
one may believe that one has a relationship with a fictive entity (e.g., "being 
on Batman's side") without believing that that entity (e.g., Batman) exists. 
However, a relationship with what one believes is a fictive entity is itself 
believed to be fictive; it is a relationship which one does not really believe 
one has. The sort of religious person with which we are concerned here does 
not believe that he has afictive relationship with God; he believes that he has 
a real relationship with God. So he is committed to the belief that God exists. 
Now consider the second class of religious persons, namely, those who do 
not believe they have a good relationship with God, but are trying to attain 
it in the first place. Of course, such persons may believe that God exists. But 
they are not committed to the belief that God exists. Quite often, we desire 
and pursue goals for which we do not believe that conditions are such that 
we will succeed. For example, we pursue such goals as winning a lottery, or 
curing a deathly ill patient. And there is nothing inherently irrational about 
our doing so. Furthermore, there is nothing inherently irrational about a 
person who pursues the goal of having some relationship with X even whilst 
not having the belief that X exists. For example, consider a scientist who 
pursues the goal of communicating with extra-terrestrial life. Following our 
analysis in the previous section of what it is to pursue a goal, such a scientist 
a') has a conception of extra-terrestrial life and of what it is to communicate 
with extra-terrestrial life, 
b') desires to communicate with extra-terrestrial life, 
c') believes that some actions are more (rather than less) likely to result in 
his communicating with extra-terrestrial life, and, 
d') he acts on his desire by (to some extent) doing (or refraining from) those 
actions. 
It would be perfectly plausible for such a scientist not to have the belief that 
there exists extra-terrestrial life. In fact, in the extreme case such a scientist 
might even believe that it is extremely unlikely that there exists such life; 
still there is nothing inherently irrational about this scientist. Similarly, it is 
not inherently irrational for a person to pursue a good relationship with God, 
even whilst not having the belief that God exists, or for that matter, even 
whilst having the belief that it is extremely unlikely that God exists. 
However, there does seem to be something irrational about pursuing a goal 
which one does not believe there is at least some chance (however small) of 
attaining. And indeed, given the analysis sketched previously of what it is 
involved in pursuing a goal, we can pinpoint the irrationality. Recall that in 
order to pursue a goal, one must believe that some actions are more (rather 
than less) likely to result in one's attaining that goal. But if one believes this, 
one is rationally committed to believe that there is at least some chance 
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(however small) that one will attain the goal. And it follows that one is 
rationally committed to believe that there is some chance (however small) 
that there exists whatever is necessary for obtaining the goal. Thus the sci-
entist in the example above must at least believe that there is some chance 
(however small) that extra-terrestrial life exists. Similarly, all religious per-
sons are rationally committed to the belief that there is some chance (however 
small) that God exists. 
Precisely what it means to believe that there is some chance that p is a 
matter of philosophical controversy, and there is no room here to enter this 
debate. Suffice it to say that the belief that there is some chance that God 
exists is quite different from the belief that God exists. In normal usage, the 
statement "John believes P" implies that "John is more confident of P than 
not-P." But the statement "John believes there is some chance that P" does 
not imply that "John is more confident of P than not-P." Thus, a person who 
believes that God exists is more confident of God exists than of God does not 
exist. However, a person who believes there is some chance that God exists 
may in fact be more confident of God does not exist than God exists. 
We may sum up the conclusions of this section as follows. Those religious 
persons who believe that they have a good relationship with God are rationally 
committed to believe that God exists, and a fortiori they are committed to believe 
that there is at least some chance that God exists. Those religious persons who 
do not believe that they have a good relationship with God are not committed 
to believe that God exists. But, all religious persons are committed to believe 
that there is at least some chance (however small) that God exists. 
At this point, one might be tempted to conclude that the stance which a 
religious person is committed to take on the proposition "God exists" has 
been resolved: a religious person is committed to believe that there is at least 
some chance (however small) that God exists. However, this would be quite 
odd-if only for the fact that many (and perhaps most) people who are not 
religious believe that there is some small chance that God exists! Indeed, in 
the remaining sections we shall see that there is a much stronger stance which 
the religious person must take on the proposition "God exists." 
3. The Notion of an "Assumption for Practical Purpose" 
The view I propose to articulate and defend is that a religious person is 
committed to "act on the assumption" or "assume for practical purpose" that 
God exists. Now obviously there are different ways of explicating what is an 
"assumption for practical purpose." In this section I present one way of doing 
so. 
To begin with, two general comments are in order. Firstly, the notion of an 
"assumption that P for practical purpose" (where P is some proposition) is 
not restricted to the religious dimension. There are many sorts of propositions 
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which we can assume for practical purpose. For example, one might assume 
for practical purpose that it will not rain tomorrow, that the future will be 
like the past, or that nature is uniform. This kind of assumption is obviously 
not peculiar to religion. 
Secondly, it is obvious that an "assumption that P for practical purpose" 
makes reference to some goal or goals in virtue of which the assumption is 
made by some person. A point that is less obvious but equally important is 
that different persons may assume the very same proposition P for the purpose 
of pursuing different goals; indeed, even the very same person may assume 
P for the purpose of pursuing different goals. We must also distinguish be-
tween an assumption that is made by someone for the purpose of pursuing a 
single goal or set of goals on the one hand, and an assumption that someone 
makes, as the saying goes, for "all practical purposes," or, as we may say, 
for the purpose of pursuing all of his goals. Hence, in place of speaking of 
an "assumption for practical purpose that P" it is more explicit (and less 
misleading) to distinguish an "assumption that P for the purpose of pursuing 
goal G" -where G is some specified goal or set of goals, from an "assumption 
that P for the purpose of pursuing all of one's goals." Clearly, though, an 
analysis of the latter will depend on an analysis of the former. 
Having made these preliminary points, we may now proceed to explicate 
the notion of an "assumption that P for the purpose of pursuing goal G." Of 
course, there are various ways of doing this. The particular sort of assumption 
I have in mind may also be dubbed an "action-guiding" assumption. The 
necessary and sufficient conditions for a person's making such an assumption 
are as follows: 
Given that person N pursues goal G, N makes an action-guiding assumption 
that P for the purpose of pursuing G if and only if insofar as N pursues G 
he tries to do those things which are, if P is true, more (rather than less) likely 
to result in his attaining G.3 
This somewhat cumbersome definition is best grasped by means of example. 
Suppose that Dr. Jones pursues the goal of curing a patient of a tumor, and 
that several medical options are available, such as, chemical treatments, sur-
gical procedures, and dietary regimens. Suppose also that Jones believes that 
if the tumor is benign, chemical treatments are more (rather than less) likely 
to result in the patient's cure (Le., the patient is more likely to be cured if he 
is chemically treated than if he is not chemically treated). Furthermore, Jones 
believes that surgical procedures are somewhat dangerous, and are unneces-
sary if the tumor is benign. However, Jones also believes that if the tumor is 
malignant, chemical treatments will be completely ineffectual, and in this 
case surgical procedures are more (rather than less) likely to result in the 
patient's cure (Le., the patient is more likely to be cured if surgery is done 
than if surgery is not done). Now, we may say that Jones makes an action-
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guiding assumption that "the tumor is benign" for the purpose of trying to cure 
the patient if and only if, insofar as he pursues this goal, he tries to do those 
things which are, if the tumor is benign, more (rather than less) likely to cure 
the patient. In our case, this would involve his employing the chemical treat-
ments and not the surgical procedures. But it may involve more than that. For 
example, depending on other particular facts about the patient and the nature 
of the tumor, Jones may also conclude that if the tumor is benign, certain 
dietary regimens are more (rather than less) likely to cure the patient. The 
particular actions which are dictated by Jones' action-guiding assumption that 
the tumor is benign will depend on the particular circumstances of the case. 
In effect, there is both a "cognitive" and a "practical" component involved 
in an action-guiding assumption that P for the purpose of pursuing O. A 
person who makes such an assumption engages in a research program de-
signed to figure out what things promote (Le., render it more likely that he 
will attain) goal 0 if proposition P is true. Secondly, based on his background 
beliefs as well as the information gleaned from this research, he tries to do 
those things that promote his attaining 0 if P is true. 4 
So much for clarification of the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
making what I have called an "action-guiding" assumption. This appears to 
be one of the ways in which the phrase "assumption for practical purpose" 
is used. No doubt there are other uses as well, and it would be nice to spell 
them out. Here we shall concentrate further on this particular use. It is im-
portant to contrast an "action-guiding assumption that P for the purpose of 
pursuing 0" with the hope that P and the belief that P, as well as with some 
other neighboring notions. We begin with the notion of "hope that P." Roughly 
speaking, a person who "hopes that P" desires or wants it to be the case that 
P, but does not know that P and does not know that not-Po It is easy to see 
that an "action-guiding assumption that P for the purpose of pursuing 0" 
differs from a "hope that P." To begin with, a person who hopes that P need 
not be pursuing a goal for which he guides his actions on the assumption that 
P. For example, I may hope that someday I will own a million dollars but not 
pursue any goal on the assumption that I will own a million dollars. Nor does 
it follow from the fact that one assumes that P for the purpose of pursuing 
some goal 0 that one also hopes that P. For example, in the case described 
earlier, Dr. Jones may assume that "the tumor is malignant" for the purpose 
of curing his patient, without hoping that the tumor is malignant. In short, 
hopes need not be action guiding, and action-guiding assumptions need not 
constitute things hoped for. 
Another notion worth considering here is that of "acting to pursue some goal 
o in the hope that P." This notion may seem close to the notion of an action-
guiding assumption, but our previous example (concerning Dr. Jones) also 
shows that one can be involved in doing the latter without doing the former. 
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Similarly, one can act to pursue some goal G in the hope that P without 
guiding one's actions on the assumption that P. For example, Jones may pursue 
the goal of curing his patient in the hope that the tumor is benign, even though 
he makes an action-guiding assumption that the tumor is malignant. 
Next, let us consider the difference between an action-guiding assumption 
that P for the purpose of pursuing G and a belief that P. Certainly it is quite 
compatible for someone both to believe that P and to make an action-guiding 
assumption that P for the purpose of pursuing some goal G. However, the 
one does not require or entail the other. Consider once again the example 
mentioned above. Even though Jones may not believe that the tumor is ma-
lignant, he may still decide to make the action-guiding assumption that it is 
malignant for the purpose of curing his patient. Indeed, he may doubt very 
much that the tumor is malignant, and still assume so for that specific goal. 
Conversely, a person may believe that P, without making an action-guiding 
assumption that P for the purpose of pursuing G. This may happen simply 
because the person happens not to pursue G, or because although he pursues 
G, he deems the truth or falsity of P as irrelevant to the pursuit of G. In neither 
case has the person made an action guiding assumption that P. In sum, one 
may believe that P without assuming it for some specific goal G, and, con-
versely, one may assume that P for some goal G without believing that P. 
Moreover, the notion of an action-guiding assumption that P for the purpose 
of pursuing G is not to be confused with the notion of "believing that there is 
some chance that P." Firstly, given two individuals who believe there is the 
exact same chance that P, one may assume P for some goal G and one may 
not. This may happen because the latter happens not to pursue G, or because 
although he pursues G he regards the truth or falsity of P as irrelevant to the 
pursuit of goal G. Moreover, the very same individual who believes there is 
some chance that P may assume P for one of his goals but not for another.' 
Let us consider next the contrast between the notion of an action-guiding 
assumption that P for the purpose of pursuing goal G and the notion of "acting 
to pursue goal G in the belief that P." Obviously the two differ at least to the 
extent that, as we have already seen, the notion of an action-guiding assump-
tion that P differs from the notion of a belief that P. But, it also seems that 
someone who "pursues goal G in the belief that P" is someone who pursues 
G on the action-guiding assumption that P (although not necessarily vice 
versa). This leads us to pose the following question. Where the goal is iden-
tical, to what extent would the actions involved in "acting in the belief that 
P" and "acting on an assumption that P" differ? Compare, for example, a 
defense strategist who attempts to construct a secure defense policy merely 
on the assumption that the Russians are cheating on the latest arms-treaty, 
with another strategist-exactly alike in all other respects, but-who makes 
the same attempt not only on the assumption but also in the belief that the 
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Russians are cheating. Our question is, insofar as they pursue the stated goal, 
would their actions differ? It is tempting to say that, in any realistic case, 
their actions would not differ at all. 
It is worthwhile in this context to comment on the rather common phrase, 
"acting as if one believes." In the case just described, it seems reasonable to 
say that the first strategist is "acting as if he believes" that the Russians are 
cheating. This is an accurate turn of phrase here, as long as it is kept in mind 
that it is only with respect to a limited range of his behavior that he "acts as 
if he believes" that the Russians are cheating. That is, he "acts as if he 
believes" insofar as he pursues the goal of constructing a secure defense 
policy. He need not "act as if he believes" with respect to his other goals 
(such as, the goal of forming warm personal ties with Russian diplomats). 
Moreover, in spite of the above example, it is emphatically not always the 
case that a person who pursues G in the belief that P and a person who merely 
assumes that P for the purpose of pursuing G act in the same way, even with 
respect to actions that are oriented toward G. This may occur in cases where 
the fact that a person believes P is itself relevant to determining how that 
person pursues G. Let us return to our example concerning the doctor and 
patient. Imagine that although Dr. Jones is a skilled surgeon and usually does 
his own operations, he gets too nervous to operate if he believes that a 
patient's life depends on successful surgery, and he refers any such cases to 
another surgeon. Suppose also that Dr. Jones believes that the life of any 
patient with a malignant tumor depends on successful surgery. Under these 
circumstances, there will be an important difference between the case where 
Dr. Jones pursues the goal of curing his patient in the belief that the tumor 
is malignant, and the case where he pursues this same goal only on the 
assumption that the tumor is malignant. In the former case, he will refer the 
patient elsewhere for operation; in the latter case, he will be confident enough 
to operate. And in the latter case, it would be quite mistaken to say that Dr. 
Jones is "acting as if he believes" that the tumor is malignant; if he believed 
the tumor were malignant, he wouldn't operate! Hence, there are some cases 
where a person who pursues G in the belief that P acts differently from a 
person who pursues G merely on the action-guiding assumption that P-even 
with respect to those actions that are oriented toward G. And in such cases 
it is wrong to describe the latter as "acting as if he believes" that P. 
We may summarize the discussion of the last several pages as follows. The 
notion of an action-guiding assumption that P for the purpose of pursuing 
some goal G is different from any of the following: 
a) hoping that P 
b) acting to pursue G in the hope that P 
c) believing that P 
d) assuming that P for the purpose of pursuing all goals 
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e) believing that there is some chance that P 
f) acting to pursue G in the belief that P 
In addition, we have found that in some cases, a person who makes an 
action-guiding assumption that P for the purpose of pursuing G need not act 
in the same way (to attain goal G) as a person who pursues the very same 
goal G in the belie/that P. These conclusions will be important later, when 
we turn to the topic of religious faith. 
Before doing so, it is necessary to formulate a principle which describes 
one condition under which it is pragmatically rational to make an action-
guiding assumption. I call it the Principle 0/ Rational Assumption (or PRA). 
I shall first state the principle, then give two examples of its application, and 
then attempt to defend it. 
PRA: Given a person N who pursues goal G and believes that he will attain 
G only if P is true, it is pragmatically rational for person N to make an 
action-guiding assumption that P for the purpose of pursuing G. 
An example of the application of PRA is as follows. Suppose that Dr. Jones 
pursues the goal of curing his patient of a tumor, and that he believes he will 
succeed only if the tumor is benign. PRA dictates that under these circum-
stances, it is pragmatically rational for Jones to make an action-guiding as-
sumption that the tumor is benign for the purpose of trying to cure his patient. 
Thus if Jones believes that, if the tumor is benign, he is more likely to cure 
his patient by chemical treatments than by surgery, PRA dictates that it is 
pragmatically rational for him to use the treatments rather than the surgery. 
Another example is as follows. Suppose that Smith pursues the goal of win-
ning the next election against the incumbent, and that Smith believes he will 
win only if there is currently widespread dissatisfaction with the incumbent. 
PRA dictates that under such circumstances, it is pragmatically rational for 
Smith to make an action-guiding assumption that there is widespread dissat-
isfaction with the incumbent for the purpose of pursuing the goal of winning 
the election. For example, Smith may believe that if there is widespread 
dissatisfaction with the incumbent, it is more likely that Smith will win if he 
espouses radically new policies than if he does not do so. If so, PRA says 
that, insofar as Smith pursues the goal of winning the election, the pragmat-
ically rational thing for him to do is to espouse radically new policies. 
From these examples it is easy to see that PRA is, at the very least, intu-
itively plausible. Jones believes he will cure the patient only if the tumor is 
benign. So (given his other beliefs) there is no point in his doing the surgery, 
and his only sensible strategy is to use chemical treatments. True, Jones 
believes that if the tumor is malignant the chemical treatments are unlikely 
to help; but Jones believes that if the tumor is malignant he will not cure the 
patient anyhow. Similarly, Smith believes that he will win only if there is 
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widespread dissatisfaction with the incumbent. In trying to win the election, 
he does well to guide his actions on the assumption that there is such dissat-
isfaction. In general, then, PRA seems valid. 
A more rigorous defense of PRA requires us first to comment on the notion 
of "pragmatic rationality." It would take us far afield to dissect this notion. 
However, it seems plausible to say that given a person N who pursues goal 
G, it is pragmatically rational for person N to try to do action A if it follows 
from some of N's beliefs that of all his available options, it is most likely 
that he will attain G if he does action A. To take a simple example, suppose 
N has the goal of getting to Chicago by train, and that N believes that of two 
available trains, it is more likely that train One is going to Chicago than train 
1\vo. It follows from N's beliefs that of all his available options, he is most 
likely to attain his goal if he takes train One. We may say, then, that given 
N's goal of getting to Chicago, it is pragmatically rational for him to try to 
take train One. Now I caution the reader that we have defined a course of 
action as "pragmatically rational" in such a way that it does not matter 
whether N's goal is good or bad, rational or irrational (if goals can be eval-
uated in this way). Nor does it matter whether N's relevant belief is true or 
false, rational or irrational. For example, suppose that N pursues the goal of 
traveling backward in time, and that he (irrationally) believes it is more likely 
that he will do so if he fasts for three days. Our definition yields that it is 
pragmatically rational for N to fast for three days. One might balk at this 
result, since from an "objective" point of view, it is not rational for N to fast 
for three days. However, this does not mean that our notion of pragmatic 
rationality is in itself "subjective." It is neither subjective nor objective. The 
matter may be put as follows. If N's goal and the relevant belief are objec-
tively rational, then the course of action will be objectively pragmatically 
rational. And if N's goal or his relevant belief is not objectively rational, then 
the course of action will be only subjectively pragmatically rational. 
To return to PRA. Given this conception of "pragmatic rationality" we can 
now see that PRA is valid. If a person N pursues goal G and believes he will 
attain G only if P is true, it follows from N's beliefs that he is more likely 
to attain G if he makes an action-guiding assumption that P than if he does 
not. Using our earlier example, given Dr. Jones' goal of curing his patient, 
and his belief that he will cure the patient only if the tumor is benign, it 
follows from Dr. Jones' beliefs that he is more likely to cure the patient if 
he does those things which are, if the tumor is benign, more (rather than less) 
likely to result in his curing the patient. Hence it is pragmatically rational (in 
the sense defined above) for Jones to guide his actions on the assumption that 
the tumor is benign. Thus, in general, PRA is a valid principle. 
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4. The Religious Person's Stance on "God Exists" 
Let us turn, at last, to religious faith. At the outset of this paper we said 
that one question at stake in the debate about faith is, What stance is a 
religious person committed to taking on the proposition ~God exists" -given 
the fact that he is religious? We may now supply a rigorous answer to this 
question. A religious person is committed to making an action-guiding as-
sumption that ~God exists" for the purpose of pursuing a good relationship 
with God. He is Ucommitted" to taking this stance in the sense that it is 
pragmatically rational for him to do so. The proof of this is as follows. Recall 
our conception of a religious person as someone who pursues the goal of 
having a good relationship with God. Now such a person believes he will 
succeed in having a good relationship with God only if God exists. Hence, 
by PRA it follows that it is pragmatically rational for a religious person to 
make an action-guiding assumption that God exists for the purpose of pursu-
ing a good relationship with God. Now it would be improper to say that faith 
consists in this assumption, since faith may involve more than the religious 
person's stance on ~God exists." However, to the extent that faith consists 
partly in that stance, we may say that faith consists partly in an action-guiding 
assumption that God exists for the purpose of pursuing a good relationship 
with God. 
What is involved in having this sort of faith? To begin with, as with any 
action-guiding assumption, there are two components involved, namely, a 
cognitive and a practical aspect. The cognitive aspect consists in trying to 
figure out what actions are, if God exists, more (rather than less) likely to 
result in one's having a good relationship with God. The practical aspect 
involves trying to carry out those actions. 
Now the precise nature of the actions dictated by this sort of faith will 
depend first and foremost on the religious person's conception of God. It is 
not our task here to account for how one arrives at a conception of God, much 
less to defend one conception in particular. But, for the sake of example, let 
us consider what actions would be dictated on a Biblical conception, where 
God assists those who pursue a good relationship with him, and indeed the 
success of the religious person's quest is dependent on God's assistance. On 
this conception of God, faith requires that the religious person conduct his 
pursuit on the assumption that indeed God will assist him. Moreover, on a 
Biblical conception, God responds at least on some occasions to petitionary 
prayer. Thus faith requires that the religious person at least on some occasions 
pray to God for assistance in his pursuit of God. Finally, on this conception, 
God turns away from those who do what is evil, so faith requires that the 
religious person avoid doing evil. 
But the actions required by this sort of faith will depend not only on one's 
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conception of God but also on one's personal experience, as well as one's 
historical and cultural background. On the present view, faith requires a 
religious person to interpret events in his own life, in the life of his commu-
nity, and in the world at large in the context of the assumption that God exists, 
strictly for the purpose of reckoning how he should react to these events in 
order to promote his goal. For example, suppose a person has an extraordinary 
or even ordinary experience, in which it seems to him either very strongly or 
very faintly that God is in some way revealing himself. Or, to take another 
example, suppose a person witnesses unusual events (of the miraculous sort 
such as those described in the Bible or of the more mundane sort such as 
medically inexplicable recovery from a fatal disease) that seem to point 
toward the hand of God. Or, consider a person who only hears of or reads 
about accounts of such religious experience or unusual events. On the present 
view, faith requires a religious person to interpret these events on the assump-
tion that God exists, for the purpose of pursuing a good relationship with 
God. A person in any of the above situations may conclude that, if God exists, 
God is communicating some message or directive to him. (Precisely what that 
message or directive might be will again depend on the particular circum-
stances.) And, should the person conclude that if God exists, some specific 
message or directive has been communicated, faith will also require that he 
try to incorporate that message or fulfill that directive in his pursuit of a good 
relationship with God. 
This pragmatic conception of religious faith is rooted in the Bible. The 
Hebrew term usually translated as "faith" is emunah, which often connotes 
trust, reliance, or dependence. 6 Now there is no intention here to insist that 
the above is an analysis of the Biblical emunah. However, it is clear that a 
person who has emunah in God is a person who trusts in God, in (at least) 
the sense that he is willing to act in ways that count on God's existence. In 
particular, he is willing to pursue a good relationship with God, on the 
assumption that God exists. Thus, a person who has emunah in God must (at 
least) have the sort of pragmatic faith worked out above. Whether this is all 
that Biblical emunah amounts to is a question we cannot explore here. 
5. Other Conceptions of Religious Faith 
The view presented in this paper is that faith consists at least partly in an 
action-guiding assumption that God exists for the purpose of pursuing a good 
relationship with God. This leaves open that faith may involve other things as 
well. Nevertheless, it is instructive to contrast the present view (partial though 
it may be) with other conceptions of faith articulated in recent literature. 
John Hick has viewed faith as an interpretive framework within which the 
religious person experiences or apprehends God.? Clearly, Hick intends that 
someone who has "faith" in his sense believes that God exists.8 Now on our 
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account, faith does involve interpreting one's experience in terms of the 
assumption that God exists, but strictly as a means to figuring out how to go 
about achieving a good relationship with God. Although there is an element 
which our conception of faith shares with Hick's, absent from ours is the 
notion that the function of faith is specifically to experience God. Moreover, 
as we have already seen, a person can make an action-guiding assumption 
that P for the purpose of some goal G without having the belie/that P. Hence 
a person who assumes that God exists for the purpose of pursuing a good 
relationship with God, does not necessarily have faith in Hick's sense. Fi-
nally, it is not at all clear that someone who has faith in Hick's sense must 
pursue the goal of relating well to God, much less guide his actions toward 
that goal on the assumption that God exists. Thus, someone who has faith in 
Hick's s~nse does not necessarily have faith in the sense advocated in this 
paper. 
In his book Faith and Reason, R. G. Swinburne describes three views of 
religious faith, viz., the Thomist, the Lutheran and the Pragmatist. 9 The last 
comes closest to the view of faith advocated here, but, as we shall see shortly, 
Swinburne formulates it in such a way that there remains an important dif-
ference. Now on both the Thomist and the Lutheran views, faith involves the 
belief that God exists, which, once again, is not necessarily required by the 
view of faith advocated here. However, what Swinburne calls the Pragmatist 
view of faith does not require the belief that God exists. Rather it requires 
acting on the assumption that God exists. But what is involved in acting on 
the assumption that God exists? "To do this," writes Swinburne, "is to do 
those actions you would do if you did believe [in God)."lo Now this Pragma-
tist account of faith is indeed similar to the one advocated here, in that neither 
require belief that God exists. Nevertheless, there remains an important dif-
ference between the accounts. 
To begin with, on Swinburne's Pragmatist view of faith, it is not clear 
precisely for the sake of what goal the assumption that God exists is made. 
As we saw above, action-guiding assumptions are always made for the sake 
of some goal or other, or for the sake of all of one's goals. It is likely that 
Swinburne means to say that (on the Pragmatist view) the assumption that 
God exists is made for the sake of all of one's goals, since, as he says with 
no restriction, a person who has such faith "acts as if he believes." However, 
on the view advocated in this paper, faith involves assuming that God exists 
strictly for the purpose of pursuing the goal of attaining a good relationship 
with God. Well, perhaps Swinburne also intends that somehow (on the Prag-
matist view) the application of assumption is restricted to the pursuit of a 
religious goal. If so, it is still incorrect or at best misleading to describe a 
person who makes this assumption as "acting as if he believes that God 
exists." For, as we saw above, it is quite mistaken to think that a person who 
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assumes that P for the purpose of pursuing goal G need behave "as if he 
believes" that P, even with respect to those actions which he takes as means 
to G. The reason for this is that even if a person assumes that P for the purpose 
of pursuing G, the very fact that he does not believe P may make a difference 
as to what he does to attempt to achieve G! Consider the following example. 
Imagine two persons (call them" A" and "B") who pursue the goal of relating 
well to God, and who are alike in all respects, except for the fact that whereas 
A believes that God exists, B does not. Suppose further that both make 
action-guiding assumptions that God exists for the purpose of pursuing the 
goal of relating well to God. Now A may very well come to the conclusion 
that one appropriate means to his relating well to God is his verbally affirming 
the existence of God each day. But we can easily imagine that B concludes 
that in spite of the fact that he pursues the very same goal of relating well to 
God, and in spite of the fact that he has made an action-guiding assumption 
that God exists, it is not appropriate for him to verbally affirm God's exis-
tence, precisely because (he concludes) that these activities are appropriate 
as means to the religious goal only if one actually believes that God exists. 
Indeed, we can plausibly imagine that A might agree that for B the verbal 
affirmation of God's existence is inappropriate as a means to B's relating 
well to God. Thus, it would be quite incorrect to describe B as "acting as if 
he believes that God exists." Whereas Swinburne's Pragmatist view of faith 
urges us to blur this crucial distinction, the account given in this paper 
preserves a sharp line between "assuming that God exists for the purpose of 
pursuing a good relationship with God" and "acting as if one believes that 
God exists." 
Another philosopher who has proposed a view about the nature of religious 
faith is Louis Pojman, in his book Religious Belief and the Will. Pojman 
concerns himself with the question of what sort of propositional attitude is 
"adequate for religious faith,"11 or, as he sometimes says, "adequate for the 
essential benefits of religion."12 Pojman begins by criticizing the more tradi-
tional view that belief that God exists is necessary for religious faith, mainly 
on the grounds that a person can "act on" a proposition without believing it. 
Now the position of this paper is in agreement with Pojman's view that the 
belief that God exists is not required for living a religious life. But I believe 
that Pojman's discussion suffers because he does not offer a rigorous account 
of what it is to be religious nor what it is to "act on" a proposition. Indeed, 
instead of drawing the natural conclusion that faith consists (at least partly) 
in some form of "acting on" the proposition God exists, Pojman seeks some 
further propositional attitude which will somehow guarantee that a person 
acts on that assumption. He suggests that faith consists in the "hope" that 
God exists. This does not seem to suit Pojman's purpose, since, as we saw 
earlier, having hope that P does not entail that one makes an action-guiding 
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assumption that P. In any case, we may conclude this section by remarking 
that whereas Pojman's account of faith insists that "hope" that God exists is 
required for faith, the account offered in this paper does not. 13 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Finally, some brief remarks on the implications of the present view of faith 
for the traditional problem of whether it is (or can be) rational to have faith. 
First I must emphasize that these remarks are tentatively put forward, since 
all I have done in this paper is offer an account of the stance a religious 
person must take with respect to God's existence, and religious faith may 
arguably involve more than this. 
Having said this, we may remark (recalling the result of section 2) that on 
the present account, it is irrational to have faith without believing that there 
is some chance (however small) that God exists. Hence the rationality of faith 
does not require the rationality of the belief that God exists, but rather the 
rationality of the belief that there is some chance (however small) that God 
exists. On the other hand, faith does not consist in either of these beliefs, 
since it involves the assumption that God exists for the purpose of pursuing 
a good relationship with God. Hence one cannot show that it is rational to 
have faith merely by showing that it is rational to believe that God exists or 
that there is some chance that God exists. Finally, we have seen that given 
the goal of the religious person, and given his belief that he will attain that 
goal only if God exists, it is pragmatically rational for that person to make 
the action-guiding assumption. But (recalling a distinction made in section 
3) this leaves open whether it is objectively pragmatically rational to have 
faith. Now clearly the belief of the religious person that he will attain the 
goal only if God exists is objectively rational. Thus one could show that his 
action-guiding assumption is objectively pragmatically rational, if one could 
show that it is objectively pragmatically rational to pursue the religious goal. 
It would then follow that faith is, at least in part, objectively pragmatically 
rational to have. Needless to say, the question of whether it is (or can be) 
objectively pragmatically rational to pursue the religious goal still remains 
to be explored. 
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